Introduction
In South African law a claim for loss of support is based upon the maintenance obligation of the deceased breadwinner in lieu of a relationship of dependency.
1
Typical examples of such relationships of dependency would include parent and child, husband and wife, grandparents and grandchildren, and brothers and sisters. 2 In this discussion the focus will fall on the second example mentioned, namely the relationship of dependency between husband and wife. 3 'Actual' dependency, or domestic economic subordination, is not a pre-requisite. 4 In modern households it is common to find both spouses in the job market earning a salary. The dependent spouse must prove that he or she had a right of support against the deceased and that he or she suffered a loss due to the breadwinner's death. [2002] 212 CLR 338 (HC) 347: " [I] njury can occur in circumstances in which there is no dependency. For example, it is now common for both parties to a legal or de facto marriage to have salaried or income-producing occupations. Each may expect to obtain financial advantage from the other, even where they are both fully able to support themselves from their own income, and are therefore not 'dependent' in any sense." 5
Visser and Potgieter Law of Damages 247. See also Santam Insurance v Fourie 1997 1 SA 611 (A) in which it was held that the children of a working mother, who had been killed negligently, did not suffer any patrimonial loss due to her death. The mother was under a duty to support her children, but she received more from the household money pool than she had contributed to it. It can therefore not be said that she made any contribution to the maintenance of the children.
4/25 this influence should be, is not always clear. According to Davel, 11 the demands for fairness, justice and public policy requires that the widow's claim for damages should not be influenced by her remarriage. In line with her sentiments are those who believe that the benefits received from re-partnering, or the probability of re-partnering, 12 are res inter alios acta and should for this reason not be taken into account in a claim for support. 13 On the other hand, the opinion expressed by Koch 14 is that adjustments for remarriage are reasonable if compensation in a lump sum is understood correctly, namely as a fair price in exchange for the right to litigate further against the defendant. 15 In spite of these academic opinions re-partnering or the probabilit y o f r epartnering is taken into account in the quantification of a claim for loss of support.
In this discussion the wider concept of family dependency will be discussed first. Thereafter a distinction will be drawn between the situation where repartnering is an actuality or the intention is real and the situation where repartnering is only a future probability. 16 Of more practical importance for the quantification process is the distinction drawn by the courts between general and special contingencies, and whether the contingency of re-partnering will be regarded as the one or the other. After discussing this distinction, guidelines will material prospects, it follows that allowance must be made for such factors as the possibility of remarriage"; Davel 1989 De Jure 370, 372. 12 In AA Tegel v Madden [1985 2 NSWLR 591 (SC) 611 Mahoney AJ described the contingency as the capacity to marry and not as the probability of remarriage. 13 Visser and Potgieter Law of Damages 226 n 156 and the authority cited. See par 7 below on the three Australian jurisdictions where the legislature has promulgated legislation forbidding the use of remarriage as a contingency deduction. This is also the position in English law - 5/25 be given to explain the quantification process that needs to be followed. It is in particular during this process that the South African case law lacks predictability and certainty, and valuable lessons can be learned from Australian law in this regard.
2
A wider concept of family dependency at some time her husband may predecease her and that she may remarry and derive financial benefit from a second marriage. While her husband lives the value of this chance is small. It may even be negligible, if not non-existent, for older wives and others whose remarriage prospects might for religious or other reasons be somewhat restricted. For many wives the fact of the death of the husband brings about a massive increase in the chance of remarriage and an according increase in the financial value of that chance. In the computation of damages it is the enhanced value of this chance which is being deducted when allowance is made for the remarriage prospects of the widow. If the widow has in fact remarried, then one may adduce evidence not only of this fact but also of the financial standing of the new husband. [I]t may be suggested that a de facto relationship is less likely to endure (or to endure for as long) as where the parties have entered into marriage. But just as courts have hitherto looked to declarations of intent to marry before the trial and to the fact of marriage before the trial, I believe they may look to other relationships akin to marriage both to ascertain the loss that has in fact been suffered to the date of the trial and to attempt the realistic evaluation of the likely extent of the loss into the future.
47
With the above quotation in mind, one could rightly ask the question whether possible benefits from informal or de facto heterosexual and homosexual relationships should not also be taken into account in the quantification of a claim for loss of support. In terms of the new Civil Unions Act 17 of 2006 all monogamous relationships, whether homosexual or heterosexual, has the potential to be recognised some time in the future (once the partners choose to make use of the registration procedures) and for this reason benefits from these relationships should in principle also be taken into account.
Quantification of re-partnering as a probability
Once the court has, as a first step, completed the value judgment on the probability of re-partnering, the court needs to quantify this probability. Case law indicates a high level of uncertainty about how to quantify re-partnering as a contingency. The main reason for this is that the facts of each case are and whatever else the judge may consider relevant. It is, however, customary for the actuary to give expert evidence on the amount, not only of the value of the widow's loss of support, but also on the amount of the deduction to be made for the possibility of her remarriage"; Howroyd and Howroyd 1958 SALJ 74: "It is not usually possible for the actuary to enter into such delicate matters as the personal appearance and temperament of the widow -this is by tradition the prerogative of the judge -but in exceptional cases where the widow had, for example, been badly scarred, some adjustment to the deduction based upon averages is clearly required." 46 AA Tegel v Madden [1985] 2 NSWLR 591 (SC) 605. 47 Also see Luntz and Hambly Torts 632.
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11/25 unique, so that one cannot attach much value to precedent. The endeavour remains to identify and provide guidelines from case law with as purpose, a more consistent and morally justifiable quantification of re-partnering as a contingency.
The courts, in most cases, will either reduce the contingency to an amount, 48 or they will express the value of the contingency as a percentage of the value of the loss of support. 49 Where the court during the initial step considered facts, it is now obliged to venture 'guesses' in terms of the quantification process.
According to Koch 50 the court must give consideration to two factors during this process, namely the expected amount of years that the plaintiff will remain without a formal partner 51 and the financial position of her next partner.
52
Should these factors not be specifically mentioned in court, something that incidentally happens frequently, it creates the impression that the court has not given these two factors any consideration at all. Koch warns that the …factors which influence the judicial assessment of the average duration of widowhood are commonly highly speculative and the court, it is respectfully submitted, should be astute not to allow minor considerations to assume undue weight.
53
In respect of the financial position of the next partner, it is expected that the widow would re-partner into the same social class as before and that her financial circumstances would also be similar to what she had with her previous The fact that the widow in this case acknowledged that she would remarry, should the opportunity arise to meet the right man, probably resulted in the heavier weighting given in the determination of the range of the contingency adjustment.
Also in Burns v National Employers General Insurance Co Ltd
61 the court found that the widow's claim for loss of support had to be reduced by twenty percent for general contingencies, which inter alia included the probability of divorce.
Thereafter her claim was reduced by a further forty percent in lieu of the probability of remarriage. provision had already been made for the children; she was young and beautiful and there was a probability that she would remarry. Once again there was an oversight in that no mention was made of the financial position of the second husband. 
Trimmel v Williams

15/25
It can be stated that courts should be wary to regard statistics on the probability of re-partnering as a guideline, or even as a point of departure, in the determination of adjustments, but should rather regard it merely as one of the multiple factors that must be considered.
71
In general it can be stated that South African courts tend to give serious consideration to the probability of a widow re-partnering and they are inclined to make substantial accommodation for this. It is nevertheless true that the proven factual circumstances do not always warrant these high adjustments, especially if they are preceded by a general contingency adjustment.
72 6
Re-partnering as a general or special contingency
The distinction between general and special contingencies justifies a discussion on its own, 73 but for purposes of this discussion the following brief summary has to suffice:
74
(1) General contingencies are regarded as general for the reason that they could be present in the lives of all people at any time, for 16/25 example death or sickness; specific contingencies are regarded as specific because they are primarily relevant in specific people's lives at specific times, for example re-partnering or divorce.
(2) General contingencies need in general not be proven, whereas specific contingencies have to be substantiated by evidence, although not necessarily proven on a preponderance of probabilities.
(3) A general contingency deduction is usually low (at average ten per cent), whereas a contingency deduction for specific contingencies fluctuates (between five and fifty per cent) depending on the evidence and circumstances of the plaintiff.
If one strictly applies the above-listed distinctions to re-partnering it has to be categorised as a specific contingency. The following two important guidelines should, however, be applied: (1) Evidence must be presented to validate repartnering as a specific contingency and (2) the percentage deduction for repartnering must be in proportion to the probability of its occurrence. or other relationships are a mere probability in the future, but also to instances where it is a real or definite possibility. One could argue that in instances where re-partnering with real benefits has already taken place before the date of trial, the application of these statutory prohibitions will lead to double compensation.
It is for this reason not suggested that similar statutory prohibitions be envisaged for South Africa, but rather that the judiciary applies it's discretion in a fair manner according to the guidelines suggested at the end of this discussion.
Apart from the three mentioned jurisdictions in Australia regulated by statute, Chief justice Gleeson distinguished between cases where the claimant had already remarried (re-partnered) and cases where remarriage (re-partnering)
had not yet occurred. In the instance where remarriage had occurred, or where a marriage with a specific person was a definite prospect, the court could examine the circumstances of the particular case and make appropriate adjustments. 85 Therefore, the remarriage did not automatically exclude the right to support.
Where remarriage had not yet occurred, a double contingency had to be addressed: Firstly, the probability that the claimant would remarry and secondly, the probability that financial advantage would flow from this union.
Chief justice Gleeson was of the opinion that the court's subjective adjudication of both these contingencies would be speculative in nature and that even statistics would not sufficiently assist the court. 86 The fact that these Sales v Ingrilli [2002] 212 CLR 338 (HC) 365: "Seldom, if ever, will a court be able to make any useful prediction about whether, or when, one human being will form a close emotional attachment with another. Statistics may provide some basis for saying, in some cases, that it is more probable than not that, at some time over (say) the next 20 years a surviving spouse will form a new relationship. The younger the survivor, the more likely may that be to occur. But, in very many cases, statistics will provide little useful guidance about the time by which it is more probable than not that it will occur." In Jones v Schiffmann [1971] 124 CLR 303 (HC) 306 Barwick CJ specifically referred to statistics on remarriage and he held the opinion that they were irrelevant in claims for loss of support. contingencies were unpredictable, did not however release the courts from the obligation to take this into account. According to him, the uncertainties involved in the probability of remarriage were not greater or smaller than those apparent in other 'vicissitudes of life' such as unemployment, which usually forms part of a general contingency adjustment.
87
The majority finding of the court by justice Kirby 88 was that in cases where remarriage has not yet occurred, remarriage or re-partnering could no longer be applied as a specific contingency, which tends to be higher than the general contingency adjustment. However, it was held that the degree to which economic advantages or disadvantages of hypothetical re-partnering remained relevant in the calculation of the loss suffered as a result of the death of the breadwinner, it should now be taken into consideration as part of the 'standard' adjustment (general contingency adjustment) for uncertain future events. The
High Court determined that the general contingency adjustment, which incorporated re-partnering, should only be five percent:
89 Re-partnering is merely another of the many possible vicissitudes of life, namely that the claimant may enter an economically beneficial or detrimental relationship after the trial. It is therefore to be given no more weight than any of the other vicissitudes that go to make up the general discount. The 'standard' adjustment should not be increased to re-introduce the 'remarriage' discount by the back door. 90 my opinion, provide some assistance. I recognize, of course, that they can be used only as a guide to the statistically average, and must yield to the circumstances which govern the case under consideration. They do, however, indicate that the average rate of remarriage for say widows under thirty years of age, is high rather than low; and that, on the average, a widow under thirty has a better than even chance of remarrying within ten years. Re-partnering will only be regarded as a specific contingency if it has already taken place at the time of quantification. The specific contingency adjustment for re-partnering will be based on the future uncertainty of the effect of the repartnering on the claim for loss of support. The future uncertainty refers inter alia to the lifetime of the new relationship and the financial position of the new partner. The extent of the adjustment for this specific contingency will be determined by the specific evidence presented to court.
If these guidelines are followed it will limit to a certain extent the discretion of the court in quantifying the claim for loss of support.
established rule that, in a wrongful death action, the court must assess and value the chance of the surviving spouse obtaining financial support in the future from remarriage. 
